Introduction
This paper investigates performance persistence among hedge funds by studying their direct actions. Specifically, we investigate whether there is persistence in activism strategy and whether this persistence influences investment profitability.
The question of the existence of persistence outperformance in professional investment management lies at the heart of the market efficiency literature. Numerous papers investigate mutual fund performance persistence (see, Grinblatt and Titman (1992) , Droms and Walker (1994) , Brown and Goetzmann (1995) , and Carhart (1997), among others) and conclude that mutual funds, on average, underperform passive investments and those that outperform do not have persistent performance.
However, does this finding imply that professional money managers do not, on average, persistently outperform the market? One may argue that results from the mutual fund industry should not be generalized to all money managers, as there are several legal constraints that these managers face.
A better laboratory for investigating performance persistence and manager skill might be the hedge fund industry. Unlike their mutual fund counterparts, hedge fund managers do not aim to track benchmark performances, have fewer legal restrictions on the potential investment opportunity set, have discretion with respect to the level of reporting of their strategies and results, and have a compensation structure that provides a greater incentive to perform well.
However, studies on hedge fund performance persistence yield conflicting conclusions. For example, there is some evidence of short term persistence among individual hedge funds (See Agarwal and Naik (2000) . However, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) , and Brown and Goetzmann (2003) . find no evidence of performance persistence investigating yearly returns and long term performance and Boyson (2008) in a recent paper finds no evidence of persistence (short or long-term) when funds are selected based on past performance alone and claims that style factors explain the previous findings of short-term persistence. 1 In comparing the conflicting results on the persistence of hedge fund performance, it is important to note that there is no one database that contains data on the whole universe of hedge fund industry activity. The three main hedge fund database providers used in academic research are: CISDM, HFR and TASS; because each contains a self-reported sample, bias is created when using these samples for research.
2 Moreover, the academic literature that focuses on investigating persistence in the hedge fund industry uses a range of return measures-either raw return measures (pre-or post-fee) or risk-adjusted return measures (Sharpe ratio or alpha).
One of the main criticisms of the use of various return measures in the hedge fund industry to investigate performance persistence is that there are biases in the documented returns (and their indices) because these returns are self-reported by hedge funds (for the documentation of bias in hedge funds returns, see Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) , Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2006) , and Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon (2009) , among others).
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While there are many open questions with respect to hedge funds' total activity persistence, the focus of this paper is different. We do not search for persistence in funds' returns but rather persistence in activism. Since it was previously documented in the literature that activism actions are correlated with abnormal returns (see for example Brav et al. (2008) , and Klein and Zur (2009a, 2009b) ), we use the action and intent of actions as our measure. In this paper we ask if an investor that 1 For a review of the literature on hedge fund persistence, see Eling (2008) 2 Liang (2000) documents survivorship bias in the TASS and HFR databases. 3 For documentation about persistence in private equity, see Kaplan and Schoar (2005) ; for a discussion of the limitation of the data in the private equity database see Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009. consider selecting a particular hedge fund for an investment should investigate its past activism record. If indeed past activism is an indicative of future activism and total results, then, there is value to investigate and to collect this information.
In order to overcome self-selection bias and bias in self-reported returns, we hand-collected data from a subsample of the hedge fund industry along with a focus on published activities.
While the advantages of this approach are clear -a cleaner sample and the ability to focus on real actions rather than incentive-driven, self-reported data -there is a disadvantage in the small size of the subsample of the hedge fund universe. Hence we limit our conclusions to the hedge fund activism type of fund investigated, rather than hedge funds in general. Moreover we limit our conclusion about persistence to activism activity rather than to persistence in the total return. Nevertheless, since there is neither an institutional nor a regulatory definition of a hedge fund and since the literature characterizes hedge funds simply as pooled investment vehicles open to only a limited group of investors 4 that generally invest capital on a collective basis, and since there is a documentation that controlling for style is important in the study of hedge fund persistence, we feel that there is room to focus on a subsample of this universe based on shared characteristics of the funds and that the advantages of handcollected data compensate for the lack of generalizability.
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We begin with a description of the hand-collected data. This study examines a comprehensive sample of activism campaigns 6 by 117 hedge funds that engaged in 4 The investments are organized as -3(c)(1)‖ or -3(c)(7)‖ funds, referring to exemptions from mutual fund registration. Funds organized as 3(c)(1) funds are limited to 99 -accredited‖ investors. Section 3(c)(7) funds may have up to 499 -qualified‖ investors, but the net worth requirement is higher. 5 For a description of the different investment styles of hedge funds see Brown and Goetzmann, 2003 695 active investments during the period 1994-2006. We identify hedge fund activism based on fund choices among required Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. 7 The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires a person or group of persons to publicly disclose stockholdings exceeding a threshold of 5% of a firm's outstanding shares or any class of shares within 10 days of reaching that threshold.
When a hedge fund has specific plans to influence the target firm, or when it is unwilling to forfeit the option of influencing the firm in the future, the fund must file a Schedule 13D.
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Our first contribution to the literature is to suggest several indexes which can be used to investigate past activism performance and to document their explanatory power with respect to future hedge fund activity. The first proposed index is based on relative activism, or actual, published fund activism versus the total number of fund investments (total activity). Based on the literature on hedge fund activism, we focus on Section 13D filings, board appointments, and the threat of proxy fights. We give each of these factors equal weight (1/3). In order to control for the total activity of each fund, each variable is divided by the total number of investments undertaken by that fund.
The second index uses the same three activism indicators, but goes on to capture performance relative to the peer group (other hedge funds in the same year).
We show that the two indexes are highly correlated to one another.
We investigate the determinants of the levels of our activism indexes. We find that minimum investment requirements are positively correlated with all indexes. That 7 The definition of hedge fund activism and investment in this paper is consistent with the definition in Brav et al. (2008) and Clifford (2008) but not with Klein and Zur (2009) , who examine confrontational activism only. 8 If the party acquiring the stake in the firm in the regular course of business does not intend to influence the management or control of the firm, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 permits the party to submit a Schedule 13G filing, a shorter and less burdensome filing that requires less information from the filing party.
is, those funds that require a high minimum investment from their participants have relatively higher levels of activism. Incentive fee is also positively correlated with activism, yet its significance is sensitive to the specific activism index. We also find that hedge fund activism indexes are positively and significantly correlated with a manager's attendance at top MBA programs; however, the indexes are not significantly correlated with managerial education at Ivy League schools.
We show that past activism is positively correlated with movements toward confrontational activism in future fund investments. We also show that this relation is significant even after controlling for the specific characteristics of the acquired firm.
We show that while other commonly used firm characteristics explain less than 1% of the decision to adopt a confrontational investment strategy, our relative activism index explains 33% of this decision.
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One may ask why they should be so concerned with what predicts confrontational investment? Recent research consistently shows positive returns of 7-10% around the filing of the Schedule 13D, which indicates that there are short-term gains associated with hedge fund activism. 10 Moreover, Clifford (2008) shows that firms targeted by hedge funds with non-confrontational investment purposes earn significantly lower returns compared to firms targeted by hedge funds with confrontational investment purposes.
Once it has been established that past activism activity is positively correlated with confrontational investment styles, we then show that recent activity is correlated with abnormal returns.
9 Finding persistence in documented actions is consistent with the recent work of Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2009) who document performance persistence in entrepreneurship. They show that entrepreneurs with a track record of success are much more likely to succeed than first-time entrepreneurs and those who have previously failed. 10 E.g. Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample selection and the data. In section 3 we propose and discuss the activism indexes, and show that activism predicts confrontational investment in section 4. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
Sample Selection and Data Description

Hand-Collected Data
Since there is neither an institutional nor a regulatory definition of a hedge fund, we rely on the procedure used in the recent hedge fund activism literature (e.g., Brav et al. (2008 ), Clifford (2008 , Klein and Zur (2009a, 2009b) ) to identify activist hedge funds and the companies targeted by them. Our investigation spans the period 1994-
2006.
We use a two-step procedure to create a database of activist hedge funds and their investments. In the first stage, through a search on Factiva (formerly Dow Jones Interactive) using the terms -hedge fund,‖ -activism,‖ and -activist‖ (as in Brav et al. (2008) ) we assemble a comprehensive list of activist hedge funds that engaged in large investments (over 5% of the target firm equity) during the period 1994-2006.
The data is verified through confirmation from several other sources, including fund web sites and investor journals. This process yields 117 hedge funds for our database.
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The second stage consists of collecting information on the companies targeted by the funds in our database. We identify activist hedge fund investments based on a fund's choice among required SEC filings. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 11 The database refers to all the funds in one hedge fund family as one group, and does not divide them according to the different funds. For example, the various hedge funds managed by the Tudor Hedge Fund family (i.e., Tudor Capital and Tudor BVI Global Fund) are both considered as part of Tudor Investment Corp.
requires a person or group of persons to publicly disclose large stockholdings within 10 days after the holdings exceed a threshold of 5% of the firm's outstanding shares or of a class of the firm's equity securities. When a hedge fund has specific plans to influence the target firm, or when it is unwilling to forfeit the option of influencing the firm in the future, the fund files a Schedule 13D. When a hedge fund acquires a stake in a firm merely as a passive investor purchasing the securities in the regular course of business with no intent to influence the management or control the firm, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 permits submission of a Schedule 13G, a shorter and less burdensome filing that requires less information from the filing party. For each hedge fund, we collect all first-time 13D filings for each targeted firm (available via EDGAR); in other words, a specific fund is included in our sample after it submits its first 13D or 13G filing for a particular target firm. We include no amendments submitted after the initial filing that result in a holding of more than 5%. For a graphical description of the timeline of 13D and 13G filings and an illustration of the data that is included in our sample, see Figure 1 . It is important to note that prior to 1996 there was no obligation to file either a 13D or a 13G, as their filing only became mandatory beginning in 1996.
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Using the SEC EDGAR database, we compile all 13D hedge fund filings submitted during the 1994-2006 period. From each filing, we collect both the SEC filing date and the date on which the fund crossed the 5% ownership threshold. We 12 This is taken from the EDGAR website: In early 1993 the SEC began to mandate electronic filing of forms 10-K and 10-Q for a test group of firms. All firms were phased in to EDGAR (the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system) over a 3-year period, ending May 6, 1996. As of that date, all public domestic companies were required to make their filings on EDGAR, except for filings made in paper because of a hardship exemption. When filed in EDGAR the financial reports are generally available to the public within one business day of the filing. Prior to the availability of EDGAR obtaining the annual and quarterly financial reports involved considerable search costs in the form of going to the SEC offices, requesting the reports from the firm or purchasing them from a third party. The filing of the SEC reports is not a publicized event and is not commonly discussed in the press. However, as most firms file their SEC reports on the last days of the statutory period, the SEC filing dates are easy to forecast.
repeat this exercise for all 13G filings. In our sample, we specifically note those cases where -Purpose of Transaction‖ in the hedge fund Schedule 13D filing includes a specific aggressive purpose (e.g., change board of director composition, replace the CEO) as opposed to where the investment's purpose is passive. Those cases in which the 13D filing includes specific aggressive purposes are referred to as -ACT‖ investments.
The third stage of data collection involves gathering information about the activist action pursued by each fund. Information about the board and threats to start a proxy fight are obtained from the popular press and by using the Factiva database Hand collection of this data is necessary because there is no central database of activist hedge funds, and the publicly available hedge fund databases (i.e., TASS and CISDM) are self-reported and do not comprehensively cover the activist segment of the hedge fund industry (Brav et al. (2008) claim that only 20-25% of their sample is listed on TASS or CISDM). We later match our sample with CISDM and conduct part of the analysis on the joint subsample (Table 1 .B provides a description of this subsample).
Since in this project we are interested in creating a yearly/bi-yearly measure of fund activism, for each fund and calendar year we sum the total fund activity. That is, for each fund and for each calendar year, we sum the number of 13D and 13G filings, board member nominations, and proxy fight threats.
Though we rely on the procedure used in the recent hedge fund activism literature to construct the sample, there are some differences between the sample of hedge fund activists investigated in this project and the samples in Brav et al. (2008) , Greenwood and Schor (2009), and Klein and Zur (2009a) .
Klein and Zur (2009a) research only those confrontational activist campaigns in which the activist clearly states in the -purpose‖ statement of the filing that its goal is to redirect managements' efforts, whereas we consider all Schedule 13D filings.
Greenwood and Schor (2009) The data set in this paper uses a longer time series than Klein and Zur (2009a) and Brav et al. (2008) : 13 years versus 3 and 6 years, respectively. In addition, while Brav et al. (2008) focus only on 13D filings, we also collect 13G filings. While Brav et al. (2008) include several cases of acquisitions of less than 5%, where they felt that it was appropriate to do so, for consistency we include only those cases that exceed 5% ownership.
While our database may not constitute an exhaustive set of all hedge fund activist events that occurred during the period 1994-2006, we believe that we cover the most important events. This becomes evident when we run numerous robustness tests and receive similar fundamental results (such as qualitative results regarding the trend in the buy-and-hold -10 +10 CAR returns) that are consistent with the literature (such as Brav et al. (2008) , whose database was collected independently of ours).
We hand-collect information about the management skills of 62 fund managers (total of 439 observations) from hedge fund web sites, investor journals, Factiva, and newspaper and magazine articles. This information includes whether the manager earned an MBA, the manager's Alma Mater, years of experience, and age.
We find that 37 managers earned MBAs, and that 31 of these earned their
MBAs from a leading business school. 
Data from Other Databases
The accounting data is taken from the Compustat Database, and we use data during (for flows) or at the end of (for balances) the year prior to the filing of the initial Schedule 13D. (Cash + Short-term Investments) / Assets (Cash) is the cash and short-term investments (in millions of US$) to total assets ratio, and is calculated as data#1/data#6. Total Debt / Assets is the sum of long and short-tem debt to total assets ratio, and is calculated as (data#9 + data#34) / data#6. EBITDA/Assets is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, and is calculated as data#13/data#6.
In order to calculate buy-and-hold returns, we use the CRSP database. We specifically use the market-adjusted return, which is the target's buy-and-hold return minus the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index from CRSP.
Nevertheless, due to the hand-collected nature of our sample, the matching process is not trivial; we are able to match 88% of our sample with the database provided by Compustat and CRSP. We also use the CISDM hedge fund database to collect information about the minimum initial investment policy of each fund, the management fee (the percentage that the fund is charged by the investment manager), and the incentive fee (the annual incentive compensation, as a percentage, that the fund manager receives on new profits). As documented in the literature, the CISDM is self-reported by hedge funds and as a result, it includes only a subsample of the hedge funds that are relevant to this research. We are able to match 26% of our sample with the CISDM data. Table 2 describes the characteristics of our sample. It shows that on average, the sample funds charge a 1.5% management fee on the total investment (maximum fee is 4%). The 
Measuring Past Activism
The literature on hedge fund activism focuses on three main variables as indicators of activism: 13D filings, appointments of board members, and threats of proxy fights. Since the focus of this paper is investigation of the effects of past fund activism on future activism and its consequences, we must first provide an indicator of fund activism. In this section, we provide several different indicators that measure hedge fund activism and compare them to each other. We also propose two activism indexes and investigate their predictive ability.
Persistence Index Construction
In this section, we propose two activism indexes that consist of the three activism variables already used in the academic literature. The first index is based on relative activism, or in other words, activism activity versus number of investments (total activity). The second index captures performance relative to the peer group Our yearly total activism index (YTAI) is formulated to capture the effect of the absolute total of activism activity of each fund compared with other funds' total activism activity, but without standardizing to the total number of investments as we did with the YRAI index. In order to achieve this, we create a measure that enables us to control for the fact that each variable has an entirely different initial distribution.
Our proposed index overcomes this problem. For each year, we sum the total 13D submissions, board appointments, and proxy fights. Then, for each year we calculate the distribution of these activities. If a fund in a particular year was in the top 25% of the distribution in the total number of 13D submissions, the number of board appointments, or the number of proxy fight threats for that particular year, the fund is assigned the value -1‖ for that category and -0‖ otherwise. In any particular year in our sample, a specific fund may receive the value -1‖ in any one category, in any two categories, in all three categories or in none of the categories. Again we choose to
give equal weighting to each of the three components. Top 25% 13D = Receives the value -1‖ if in the 2 consecutive years t and t+1, the total number of 13D submissions made by that fund is in the top 25% of 13D submissions (equal or greater than) made by all funds during this period, and -0‖ otherwise Top 25% Board = Receives the value -1‖ if in the 2 consecutive years t and t+1, the total number of -Board‖ appointments made by that fund is in the top 25% of board appointments (equal or greater than) made by all funds during this period, and -0‖ otherwise Top 25% Proxy = Receives the value -1‖ if in the 2 consecutive years t and t+1, the total number of -proxy‖ fight threats is in the top 25% of proxy threats made by all funds (equal or greater than) during this period, and -0‖ otherwise Table 3 Table 4 presents the correlations between the various indexes and variables.
Index Relationships
The upper (lower) diagonal in Table 4 reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations. The number presented represents clear evidence of high correlation between any two variables investigated. With regard to the four indexes, the table shows significant positive correlation between the 1-and 2-year activism indexes and between the relative and total activism indexes. The high correlations between the relative and total indexes are related to the documentation that hedge funds are able to pursue many of the stated objectives within a year. Given the high correlation between all the suggested indexes, we present the remainder of our investigation using the 1-year relative index and the 1-year ranked index. Out of those nine investments, in three different events the fund publicly threatened to start proxy fights, and in three different events managed to appoint a member to the board of the target. Cannell Capital, on the other hand, invested during the years 1999-2006 in 98 firms. However, in only three cases did this hedge fund file a Schedule 13D, and in the other 95 cases the fund filed Schedule 13G. When analyzing this fund's strategy and success during these years, we find that the fund never publicly threatened to start a proxy fight and in only one investment did it manage to appoint a member to the board.
It is interesting to observe that different funds dominate different styles of activism, and yet for example, Steel Partners II appears in the top-three funds of more than one category.
Activism Indexes, Fund and Manager Characteristics
In analyzing the hedge fund industry, Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) examine whether performance can be explained through characteristics of the hedge fund; they find that incentive fees are positively related to performance, and that fixed management fees are negatively related to performance. Liang (1999) finds that hedge fund size, lockup periods, and incentive fees are positively related to performance and that fund age is negatively related to performance. Edwards and Caglayan (2001) also find that performance is positively related to incentive fees. We confine our examination to the relationship among activism and incentive fees, management fees, and minimum investment in a subsample of funds that are represented in the CISDM database. We find that management fees, incentive fees and minimum investments are positively related to the various measures of activism (Table 6 ). Yet, regardless of the activism measure that we use, minimum investment is the most significant variable. Since the activism activities of funds are relatively observable, those funds that can demand higher fees and higher initial investments, are indeed more active.
In the mutual fund arena, there is well-established research that examines whether management skills and fund characteristics such as incentive fees, management fees, size, and age can explain fund performance. Golec (1996) finds that mutual fund performance is significantly impacted by management characteristics, and that funds run by managers with MBA degrees perform better. Golec (1996) also finds that a high management fee is associated with better performance, because a high fee is a signal of superior investment skills. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) examine the cross-sectional relation between mutual fund performance and characteristics of fund managers, and they also find that managers with MBAs outperform managers without MBAs. However, they attribute the significantly higher returns to greater holdings of systematic risk.
In addition, a 1994 study by Morningstar, Inc. on the mutual fund industry reported in Business Week (July 4, 1994, page 6) that mutual funds managed by -Ivy League‖ graduates achieved significantly higher raw returns than those of funds managed by non-Ivy league graduates over a 5-year period. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) use average SAT score as an indicator for the quality of undergraduate education, and they find that managers who graduated from higher-SAT-scoring institutions produced higher returns.
We find (Table 6A ) that hedge fund activism indexes are positively and significantly correlated with a manager's graduation from an MBA program at a top school; however, they are not significantly correlated with a manager's education at -Ivy League‖ schools.
Persistence: Predicting Confrontational Investment
When a hedge fund has specific plans to influence the target firm, or when it is unwilling to forfeit the option of influencing the firm in the future, the fund must file a Schedule 13D. 14 We define confrontational investment as present if one, the fund files a 13D (and not a 13G) and two, the fund reveals in the -purpose‖ section of the 13D that it intends to proactively influence future management decisions. If either of these two conditions is not met, we define the investment as a non-confrontational investment.
In this section, we investigate the question of what predicts confrontational investment as opposed to non-confrontational investment. First, we conduct a -horse race‖ between the various possible activism measures in order to learn which better 14 If the party acquiring the stake in the firm in the normal course of business and does not intend to influence the management or to control the firm, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 permits submission of a Schedule 13G filing, which is a shorter and less burdensome filing that requires less information from the filing party.
predicts the decision to undertake confrontational investment. Accordingly, we utilize the following probit estimation:
(5) ACT = α + βi * past activism measures + µ, where:
ACT is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the fund files a 13D and reveals that it intends to proactively influence future management decisions regarding We find that models that contain either the number of 13D filings divided by the number of investments, the1-year index or the three variables from which the index is constructed (without the 1/3 constraint), provide the highest explanatory power (approximately 33-36%).
Next, as a natural robustness check, we investigate whether the activism explanatory power persists after controlling for appropriate firm characteristics. In order to investigate this, we estimate the following probit model:
(6) ACT = α + βi * YRA + βj * target characteristics + µ, where:
ACT is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the fund files a 13D and reveals that it intends to proactively influence future managements' decisions regarding firm activities
YRA is the yearly relative index
The target's characteristics include the following variables:
MKTYPBOOK is the ratio of the firm's stock market value to the difference in the value of total assets and total liabilities in the end of the fiscal year prior to the hedge fund investment.
CASHANDINV is the ratio of the sum of cash plus short-term investments to total assets in the end of the fiscal year prior to the hedge fund investment.
TOTDEBTBYASSET is the ratio of the sum of long-and short-term debt to total assets in the end of the fiscal year prior to the hedge fund investment. Table 8 presents five models of estimation. The explanatory power of past activism activity is striking. We show that while other common firm characteristics explain less than 1% of the decision to adopt a confrontational investment style, our relative activism index explains 33% of this decision.
We estimate whether past performance is positively correlated with the positive (on average) cumulative abnormal return (-10, +10) that is documented in the activism literature. We find indeed positive and significant relation even after controlling for other documented firm accounting-related variables.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by documenting that a past record of activism on the part of a hedge fund is a good predictor of future confrontational investment. In other words, activism is persistent in our sample of hedge funds. We use an extensive, hand-collected data set from several sources to propose activism indexes. Specifically, we examine 117 hedge funds that engaged in 695 active investments during the period 1994-2006. The variables used to construct the indexes are: 13D submissions, board appointments, and threats to initiate proxy fights. The first index that we propose is based on relative activism, or in other words, published actual activist fund activity versus a fund's total number of investments (total activity). We give each factor an equal weighting (1/3). The second index uses a similar set of three activist actions yet it captures relative performance to the peer group (other hedge funds in the same year). We show that the various indexes are highly correlated to one another.
In addition to documenting that past activism is positively correlated with future fund intention of confrontational activist activity in future purchases, we show that hedge fund activism is positively correlated with minimum investment amounts and a manager's attendance at a top MBA program.
We leave for future research the connection between and consequences of activism persistence and the associated reputation that a particular hedge fund acquires. Table 1 This table reports descriptive statistics for the final sample of hedge funds and target firms. Panel A summarizes the number of firms targeted in each year by hedge fund activists. Panel B summarizes the number of firms targeted in each year by hedge fund activists that are covered in the CISDM database. Total Number of Observation is the total number of filings (Schedule 13G and Schedule 13D) in each year in our sample. Total Number of 13D filings is the number of Schedule 13D filings only in each year of our sample. ACT is the total number of confrontational filings in which the hedge fund clearly states in the -purpose‖ statement of the Schedule 13D filing that its goal is to redirect management's efforts. . YTAI i,t is the yearly total activism index calculated as, YTAI it = 1/3 * (Top 25% 13D i,t ) + 1/3 * (Top 25% Board i,t ) + (1/3 * Top 25% Proxy i,t ), YRAI i,t-t+1 is the two-year relative activism index, calculated as YRAI i,t-t+1 = 1/3 * (Number of 13D filed i,t-t+1 / Number of Investments i,t-t+1 ) + 1/3 * (Number of Boards i,t-t+1 / Number of Investments i,t-t+1 ) + (1/3 * Number of Proxy Threats i,t-t+1 / Number of Investments i,t-t+1 ), YTAI i,t-t+1 is the two-year total activism index, calculated as YTAI it = 1/3 * (Top 25% 13D i,t-t+1 ) + 1/3 * (Top 25% Board i,t-t+1 ) + (1/3 * Top 25% Proxy i,t-t+1 ). 13D is the total number of Schedule 13Ds a hedge fund files each calendar year. Board is the number of times the hedge fund successfully appoints a member to the board of one of its investments in each calendar year. Proxy is the number of times the hedge fund publicly threatens a proxy fight against one of its investments in each calendar year. *, **, *** correspond to significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. Table 4 Activism Indexes -Correlation Table   This table presents a correlation table for Table 7 Probit Estimation of Decision to Become a Confrontational Investor "Horse Race" -Different Measures
This table reports the results of probit regressions of firms targeted by hedge fund activists. The models (1 through 5) use a hedge fund's investment decision as the dependent variable. The dependent variable equals 1 when the hedge fund intends to undertake a confrontational activist campaign against the firm and 0 otherwise. 13/NUMOFINV is the total number of Schedule 13Ds each hedge fund files each calendar year, divided by the total number of investments the hedge fund files in the same year. 13D is the total number of Schedule 13Ds each hedge fund files each calendar year. BOARD/NUMOFINV is the number of times the hedge fund successfully appoints a member to the board of one of its investments in each calendar year, divided by the total number of investments the hedge fund files in the same year. Board is the number of times the hedge fund successfully appoints a member to the board of one of its investments in each calendar year. PROXY/NOMOFINV is the number of times the hedge fund publicly threatens a proxy fight against one of its investments in each calendar year, divided by the total number of investments the hedge fund files in the same year. PROXY is the number of times the hedge fund publicly threatens a proxy fight against one of its investments in each calendar year. ONEYEARINDEX is the yearly activism index. ONEYEARRANK is the yearly relative activism index. This table reports the results of probit regressions of firms targeted by hedge fund activists. The models (1 through 5) use the hedge fund's investment decision (confrontational investment) as the dependent variable. The dependent variable equals 1 when the hedge fund intends to undertake a confrontational activist campaign against the firm and 0 otherwise. ONEYEARINDEX is the yearly relative activism index. MKTYPBOOK is the ratio of the stock's market value to the difference in the value of total assets and total liabilities. CASHANDINV is the ratio of the sum of cash plus short-term investments to total assets. TOTDEBTBYASSET is the ratio of the sum of the long and short-term debt to total assets. ADJTOTDEBTBYASSET is the difference in the firm's TOTDEBTBYASSET and the median value for all firms in the firm's Fama and French ( 
